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This article concerns two leading Turkish rulers, active in the Near East during the crusading 
era: Tughtakin of Damascus and Ilghazi of Mardin. They were important commanders, but 
the surviving sources create difficulties when outlining the contours of the characters and 
cultural perspectives. Muslim authors typically present them as idealised Islamic rulers and 
yet it is difficult to accept such stereotyped portraits. This article sheds new light on these 
men, seeking to understand how far they had transitioned from the steppe culture of their 
forefathers into a more distinctively Islamic mould. It focuses in particular on the Antiochene 
chronicle written by Walter the Chancellor. He witnessed both rulers at first hand when he 
was their prisoner in Aleppo in 1119; an experience which left him deeply scarred. This is 
tainted evidence, yet it will be shown that many of Walter’s observations also provide 
invaluable insights that deserve to be taken seriously. 
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Given the choice, most historical figures would probably prefer not to have their character 
profiles drawn up by writers whom they had imprisoned and tortured. Yet such in part may 
be the fate of the Turkish warlords Najm al-Din Ilghazi (d. 1122) and Zahir al-Din Tughtakin 
(d. 1128). They were both rulers who, despite playing a crucial role in the politics of early 
twelfth century Syria, have been survived by very few reliable sources offering clues as to 
their character and world view. This article seeks to address this deficiency, considering what 
can be learnt about them from the Bella Antiochena, a chronicle detailing the principality of 
Antioch’s wars against the Turks as wells other Northern Syrian events from 1114-1122.  The 
chronicle’s author was Walter, Antioch’s chancellor at that time; a man who seems to have 
been educated as cleric and who was present at many of the events he described; most 
importantly he was incarcerated by Ilghazi after the battle of the Field of Blood and 
encountered them both at first-hand during his time in prison.1  
Ilghazi and Tughtakin were among those Turkish warriors who sought to oppose or 
negotiate with the incoming Franks during the First Crusade and its aftermath, and both 
worked to thwart the ambitious Christian attempts to expand the newly-formed Crusader 
States. They both enjoyed long and fairly successful careers. Much of Zahir al-Din 
Tughtakin’s early life was spent supporting the Saljuq sultan Alp Arslan (d. 1072), and he 
later came to serve his son Tutush (d. 1095), and subsequently his grandson Duqaq, ruler of 
Damascus.2 He was atabeg [regent] of Damascus at the time of the First Crusade and later 
became sole ruler in 1104, shortly after Duqaq passed away. From this time until his death in 
1128 he proved adept both at strengthening his city state and cementing his own power. He 
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fought wars against his Frankish, Turkish and Arab neighbours, and showed himself to be a 
capable commander. At other times he was equally prepared to make alliances and treaties 
with all these powers. He died in 1128 and was succeeded by his son Buri.  
Tughtakin’s ally and son-in-law, Najm al-Din Ilghazi, had an even more varied and 
adventurous career.3 Scion of the Artuqid family, he too began his career in service to the 
Saljuq sultans and when the sultanate fractured after Malik-Shah’s death he was caught up in 
the ensuing infighting. In these years, Ilghazi and his Turkmen allies travelled from his 
father’s iqta‘ of Jerusalem to Baghdad where he was subsequently appointed as the city’s 
governor (shihna) by the future Sultan Muhammed. Later, having alienated Muhammad by 
switching his support to his rival, Berkyaruq, in 1104, Ilghazi was compelled to travel to the 
Jazira where he assumed control over his late brother’s town of Mardin. From this base he 
sought to strengthen his own position, whilst fending off the Saljuqs, the Franks and his other 
Turkish rivals. In 1117 he briefly took control of Aleppo, which by this stage was acutely in 
need of a powerful defender, but it was only during the following year that he cemented his 
rule within its walls. In 1119 he won his famous battle against the Franks at the Field of 
Blood (Ager sanguinis) and, even more ambitiously, he launched a disastrous campaign 
against Georgia in 1121. He died shortly afterwards in 1122.  
Despite these commanders’ significance, both for crusader studies and Near Eastern 
history, we know precious little about the characters and cultural orientation of Ilghazi and 
Tughtakin. Neither they nor their Turkish peers authored any accounts of their exploits and so 
we are compelled to turn to writers from other cultures – Persian, Arabic, Hebrew, Latin, and 
so on – when reconstructing their lives. Perhaps the most obvious sources to consult to this 
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end are those written by the Muslim historians of this period; for example, the Damascene 
chronicler Ibn al-Qalanisi. In his case, he clearly held Tughtakin in high esteem and described 
him at length as a model Islamic ruler. He is depicted as a just and capable master, who was 
committed to jihad and obedient to the caliph.4 As Christie has pointed out, Ibn al-Qalanisi 
constantly referred to him by his honorific title ‘Zahir al-Din’ (‘revealer of the faith’) which 
stresses his pious character.5 Ilghazi was at times presented in similar ways. Ibn al-Azraq in 
his ‘blatantly pro-Artuqid’ history of Mayyafariqin and Amid (written c.1176–7) 
characterises Ilghazi as a pious, responsible and compassionate Islamic ruler.6 Prima facie, it 
would be reasonable to conclude that we are dealing with two devout, exemplary Muslim 
leaders.  
The problem with such characterisations, however, is that recent studies have cast 
doubt upon precisely such laudatory portrayals of early Turkish rulers. By the early twelfth 
century the Turks were still relatively new converts to Islam and scholarship has underlined 
the survival of many elements of the former steppe traditions and beliefs that were held by 
their forebears before the Turkish conquest of the Near East.7 Tughtakin may have found it 
useful to adopt an Islamic mantle at times, but Hillenbrand has indicated that he retained 
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many of his people’s pre-Islamic customs and practices.8 Indeed, a major historiographical 
question mark hangs over the traditional academic view that the Turks suddenly swapped 
their former traditions and culture for devout and orthodox Islamic practices in the mid-
eleventh century. Likewise, recent scholarship has begun to reveal that the representation of 
Turkish leaders by Muslim authors living under Turkish/Saljuq hegemony as model Islamic 
rulers reflects at least in part a legitimising discourse encouraged by the Turks following their 
conquest of the Near East; one intended to consolidate their rule and win acceptance from its 
native peoples. Safi, in his pioneering study on this topic, describes this kind of narrative as 
the ‘great Saljūq myth’ and naturally this thread within the historiography problematises any 
easy acceptance of the idealised depictions of men such as Ilghazi and Tughtakin.9 At such an 
impasse, when seeking further information about individual Turkish leaders it is necessary to 
turn to texts written in other traditions, sources whose authors were not under the same 
obligation to describe Turkish rulers according to an established template.  
Among those to take an interest in Ilghazi and Tughtakin was the Antiochene writer 
Walter the Chancellor. He was an astute observer who took a close interest in his Turkish 
neighbours. He holds the distinction of being the first known Latin author to distinguish 
‘Turkmens’ (Turcomani) from ‘Turks’ (Turci).10 At other times he followed the recent and 
distinctively Western European scholarly practice of describing Turks as ‘Parthians’, an 
association not found in other eastern Christian traditions.11 He described both Tughtakin’s 
and Ilghazi’s deeds in his retelling of the wars fought between Antioch and the Turks 
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between 1114 and 1122. Of particular interest is his unusually comprehensive account of 
these Turkish leaders’ treatment of the Frankish prisoners taken captive during the Field of 
Blood campaign and its aftermath (1119). Here Walter is both precise and detailed about their 
conduct and characters and so this section demands the closest attention. 
Walter himself was among these prisoners of war and so, as an eyewitness, writing 
soon after the event, he was in some respects well placed to comment on his captors’ 
behaviour.12 Nevertheless, he was scarcely a neutral observer. He clearly suffered acutely 
during his time in Aleppan imprisonment and witnessed horrific acts, including many 
conducted either personally by Tughtakin and Ilghazi, or on their direct orders. Consequently, 
it is natural to ask how much of his portrayal of these Turkish commanders can be accepted 
as having any basis in fact, and how much was the product of Walter’s scarred 
recollections.13 As Asbridge and Edgington have indicated, the chapters of Walter’s work 
which discuss his captivity (and which contain the bulk of his information on Tughtakin and 
Ilghazi) are situated at the end the Bella Antiochena and ‘sit rather uncomfortably with the 
rest of the text’ in that they lack attention to the recreation of an overarching narrative which 
is manifested in other parts of his text.14  Mallett has likewise observed that Walter’s 
depiction of Ilghazi suddenly becomes a lot more heated when dealing with his captivity.15 
This factor alone is enough to raise the possibility that these were, for Walter, the most 
emotionally charged elements of his text. The purpose of this article is to examine Walter’s 
presentation of these Turkish warriors, focusing on his account of their treatment of the 
Frankish prisoners (Bella Antiochena, Book II, chapters 13–16), and weighing up the value of 
his account as a source for their character, culture and conduct. By extension it will consider 
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whether any indicators can be extracted from his chronicle, showing how far these rulers had 
abandoned their people’s traditional steppe practices and spirituality for a more distinctively 
Islamic code of behaviour. To begin, however, it is necessary to review the events 
surrounding Walter’s imprisonment.  
By 1119, fighting in northern Syria had reached a crescendo and by this stage the 
Antiochenes had been in the ascendency for many years.16 In August 1115 they defeated the 
major army led by Bursuq of Hamadan. This force had been sent to the region by the sultan 
of Baghdad, but it was driven away at the battle of Tell Danith. During this campaign, both 
Ilghazi and Tughtakin had allied themselves to the Franks, fearing that the sultan might 
attempt to impress his control upon them, although they were not present at Tell Danith 
itself.17 In the following years, the Antiochene Franks continued to extend their authority 
across the region. This expansion was enabled at least in part by the political turmoil 
engulfing the major city of Aleppo after the death of its Turkish ruler Ridwan in 1113. This 
powerful regional capital was well placed to offer substantial resistance to the Franks and yet 
it failed to do so, largely on account of the sustained infighting among its ruling elite that 
characterised the period 1113–19. The forward momentum built up by the Franks stalled 
abruptly, however, when Ilghazi launched a major assault on the principality of Antioch in 
1119. This invasion led to his major Turkish victory at the Field of Blood on 28 June which 
culminated in the death of Prince Roger of Antioch along with much of his army. In the 
weeks that followed, great swathes of the Antiochene frontier collapsed with the loss of many 
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towns and strongholds.18 The situation stabilised somewhat in August with the arrival of 
reinforcements led by Baldwin II of Jerusalem and Count Pons of Tripoli. These new armies 
then attempted to drive away Ilghazi – now supported Tughtakin – and they fought an 
indecisive encounter with the two Turkish commanders on 14 August at the second battle of 
Tell Danith, during which both sides suffered substantial casualties. Following this battle, 
Ilghazi and Tughtakin returned to Aleppo and their arrival in the city sets the scene for 
Walter’s account of their treatment of their captives. 
Walter’s story of his captivity runs – in brief – as follows. Shortly after the second 
battle of Tell Danith, Ilghazi’s son (his deputy in the city of Aleppo) learned that his father 
and Tughtakin had suffered a major defeat. The city’s civic leaders came to hear of this and 
then proceeded to commiserate with their Turkish overlords whilst secretly plotting against 
them. The Turks, fearing that their authority was being undermined, then changed their story 
and proclaimed that they had just won a great victory; hoping by doing so to quell any 
rebellious stirrings among the populace. The prisoners themselves could hear these pretended 
rejoicings from their cells and Walter reports that they too were told by their captors that the 
Franks had suffered a second great defeat and that King Baldwin II was dead (although they 
subsequently heard a rumour that these were lies). Then the survivors from the Turkish army 
returned to the city and Ilghazi – named by Walter as the ‘star of the law’ (legis stella) – sent 
troops to the prisoners claiming they would take them to a place of execution and reiterating 
that they had just destroyed the Frankish army in battle.19 Their threats, however, were not 
realised and these messengers then returned to Ilghazi, who was drinking heavily and 
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encamped in tents outside the walls of Aleppo.20 On the fifth day (estimated at 19 August 
1119),21 the Frankish baron Robert Fitz-Fulk was taken away and presented before a mob, 
who wished to kill him, but Ilghazi did not let them. Robert was later executed by Tughtakin 
when he refused to deny his faith. Tughtakin then expressed the wish to execute all the 
remaining captives and to bathe in their blood. Ilghazi demurred, perceiving too much 
political advantage in retaining the prisoners, but he allowed Tughtakin to torture them. From 
this time, the Turkish commanders embarked on a sustained drinking binge and periodically 
caused prisoners to be brought before them and killed. Some were tied up and shot with 
arrows, others were buried in pits, others were dismembered and their bodies and limbs 
thrown into Aleppo’s thoroughfares. There was then a public execution where 37 prisoners 
were beheaded. The remainder were exposed to public ridicule and given the choice of death 
or conversion. Ilghazi subsequently ordered the execution of Arnulf, seneschal of Marash, 
and asked a Damascene religious leader to carry out the killing, but he refused, asking 
another emir to kill Arnulf in his place. From this time Ilghazi continued drinking until he 
was rendered insensible for 15 days.22  
This is the basic narrative of Walter’s account of the Frankish prisoners’ sojourn in 
Aleppo and it is a tale told with the utmost hostility; indeed, far more enmity is shown during 
this section than is manifested in Walter’s entire first book. He describes Tughtakin and 
Ilghazi with the greatest scorn.23 Both rulers are portrayed as frenzied monsters whose sense 
                                                          
20 The fact that they took up residence in their tents outside the walls suggests parallels to other Turkish rulers, 
most notably the Saljuq rulers, who likewise preferred such encampments. Naturally this practice speaks, at 
least in part, of their nomadic steppe background, linking them as Durand-Guédy observes ‘to their ancestors 
and their fellow-Türkmens’ (although he foregrounds other reasons for the Saljuqs at least in their retention of 
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of political advantage is almost the only curb barring them from the cruellest of excesses. 
Tughtakin is named at one point as the ‘minister of the Antichrist’ (minister Antichristi); 
which is amongst the strongest polemical phrases employed by medieval authors.24 It recalls 
– possibly consciously, probably unconsciously – apocalyptic works, such as Adso of 
Montier-en-Der’s (d. 992) treatise De ortu et tempore Antichristi (written c.950).  In this 
description of the life of the Antichrist, Adso claimed that this emissary of Satan will be 
supported by many ministers, past, present and future. Previous ministri Antichristi included 
King Antiochus, and the emperors Nero and Domitian. Clearly Walter the Chancellor felt that 
Tughtakin should be numbered amongst this pantheon of satanic villainy.25  
At other points Tughtakin is depicted gloating over the prisoners’ suffering, wearing a 
feral, gaping grin. He is said to have given a speech crowing over Robert Fitz-Fulk, saying, 
among other things: ‘Ha, Robert! Ha! Look how much use your law is to you, look where 
error and unbelief have brought you.’26 In these cases, the caricature Walter supplies, with its 
exaggerated depictions of distorted facial features and Tughtakin braying vainglorious boasts, 
recalls the portraits of ‘Saracens’ offered in the chansons (the dramatic tales of bravery, war 
and love intended predominantly for a knightly audience).27 Certainly, there is a sense of 
caricature and melodrama in Walter’s descriptions which call to mind such chivalric 
fantasies. To take one example, in the early epic Gormont and Isembart, the pagan king 
Gormont (incidentally, also described as an Antichrist) is shown crying to his Christian 
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enemies: ‘You’ve come to grief for good this time! He’s little help, this Jesus Christ.’28 
Gormont’s words recall those ascribed to Tughtakin in that both speakers decry the Christian 
God’s ability to support His people. This is a well-worn trope in such chansons where non-
Christian leaders are often shown initially mocking Christianity as a prelude to their own 
subsequent catastrophic defeat at the hands of Christian heroes, reverses that naturally prove 
the emptiness and falsity of their initial boasts. This is precisely what happens in Gormont 
and Isembart (Gormont is killed shortly after uttering these words) and it is a literary device 
that is also manifested in Walter’s Bella Antiochena. By this stage, Walter’s readers already 
know that the Turks’ claim of victory at the second battle of Tell Danith was exaggerated. 
Likewise, his chronicle concludes with a gruelling account of Ilghazi’s death (though 
admittedly not Tughtakin’s) and descent into Hell, an event that completes the work’s moral 
lesson by revealing to its audience that, for all Ilghazi’s arrogance and trumpery, he 
ultimately had to confront the judgement of God.29 Walter’s use of narrative structures which 
closely parallel those of the chansons naturally casts doubt on the accuracy of his recreation 
of events, raising the possibility that the reality was substantially reworked to conform to a 
moralising agenda.30  
Precisely why Walter elaborated his chronicle from the repertoire of the chansons is 
unclear. He may have drawn upon such works because they gave voice in some way to his 
experiences, or perhaps he was an enthusiast for such epics and he drew upon them 
instinctively because they were an underlying presence within his thought-world, or perhaps 
he deliberately drew upon them to pour scorn upon his former captors – perhaps a 
combination of the above.  
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29 Bella Antiochena, 114–15.  See also: Mallett, ‘The “other” in the crusading period’, 122.  
30Mallett’s article reaches the conclusion that Walter’s work was guided by a moralising and polemical agenda: 
Mallett, ‘The “other” in the crusading period’, 113-128.  
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Whatever his motives, the presence of such tropes within the Bella Antiochena guides 
readers to be cautious when seeking to unravel experience from subsequent embellishments. 
At some points, disentangling representation from reality becomes almost impossible. An 
example of this is Walter’s claim that Tughtakin expressed the wish to bathe in the blood of 
his slaughtered Frankish prisoners so that his youth might be renewed like an eagle.31 One 
suggestion has been that this was simply anti-Turkish polemic, drawing upon Psalm 106 
which includes the concept of youth being returned like an eagle (although there is no 
reference to bathing).32 Alternatively, this could reflect an actual cultural practice, perhaps 
one with nomadic shamanistic roots. Certainly, some shamanistic communities held a deep 
conviction both that blood holds mystical properties and that it is an essential life force.33 
Hodous discusses this conviction with reference to the later Mongol practice of 
differentiating between those opponents who should be executed bloodlessly (i.e. by 
strangulation) and those who should be killed by the shedding of blood.34 Admittedly no 
certain link can be drawn connecting Tughtakin’s behaviour to such ideas but it is 
hypothetically possible that, if he did subscribe to such beliefs, it might explain why he hoped 
to derive some kind of spiritual renewal from bathing in his enemies’ blood.35 On this point it 
is impossible to be certain and arguments can be made for both reality and representation, or 
for an admixture of the two.  
Having said this, there remains a great deal of material in Walter’s account that is 
verifiable. His statements of fact are often well grounded. He rightly observes that Ilghazi 
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2016), 108.  
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35 For discussion on bathing in blood, K. Raber, Animal Bodies, Renaissance Culture (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 106.  
13 
 
was known by the title ‘star of the law’.36 In fact the correct honorific title was ‘star of the 
religion’ (‘Najm al-Din’), although medieval Latin authors often referred to religions as 
‘laws’. Likewise, many of his contextual points of detail are either well grounded, or at least 
plausible. His observation that Ilghazi’s son Timurtash commanded Aleppo is corroborated 
by Muslim writers.37 Walter’s report that the people of Aleppo were first informed that the 
Turks had been defeated at Tell Danith on 14 August only then to be told that they had been 
victorious is broadly confirmed by the Aleppan writer Kamal al-Din (d. 1262).38 On this 
point, the second battle at Tell Danith seems to have been a very confused encounter and 
most authors, including Walter the Chancellor, present it as a rather bloody draw. During the 
fighting – seemingly – at one point a Turkish charge disordered the forces of the count of 
Tripoli, scattering three of the nine Christian battlelines and a large contingent of infantry, 
whilst at another point a Christian charge drove the Turks from the battlefield. Thus there was 
victory and defeat on both sides.39 The salient point here is that, according to Kamal al-Din, 
news from the defeated Turkish contingents arrived in Aleppo first, before news from the 
more successful Turkish warriors.40 Thus Walter’s claim that the battle was reported first as a 
reverse and then as a triumph gains plausibility.  
In a similar vein, Walter’s suggestion that Ilghazi and Tughtakin were acutely 
concerned about the Aleppan people’s reaction to the outcome of the battle is entirely 
reasonable. The longstanding Arab Muslim communities of Northern Syria were very far 
from reconciled to the idea of Turkish rule during the early twelfth century and the First 
Crusade had proved that Saljuq power was contestable. In the Aleppan region, the Banu 
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Kilab tribe, whose leading family – the Mirdasids – had formerly ruled Aleppo, rebelled 
against the Saljuq ruler Ridwan in 1100 and ravaged his lands.41 Other authors report local 
Muslim hostility including Albert of Aachen, who speaks of the ‘Saracens’ hatred for their 
Turkish masters, and the Jacobite patriarch Michael the Syrian (d. 1199), who describes how, 
during this period, the Arabs began to rise up against their former masters during the years 
following the First Crusade.42  
By extension, Aleppo itself had changed hands repeatedly following the death of 
Ridwan in 1113, and both Ilghazi and Tughtakin had a rather chequered history in their 
dealings with the city in the years preceding the Field of Blood. In 1117, and having fallen 
into a parlous state, the urban elites – in dire need of a new leader – were prepared to grant 
Ilghazi entry to Aleppo, but he was denied access to its main citadel and he abandoned the 
city soon afterwards. He then raided Aleppo’s hinterland from the nearby town of Bales. 
Tughtakin and his ally, Aqsunqur al-Bursuqi, then tried to take control but were repulsed by 
Aleppo’s citizens, who stated that they had no wish for an eastern [presumably meaning 
‘Turkish’] ruler. Either before or during these events, the Aleppans sought protection from 
the Franks.43 It was only when the Franks launched a further raid into Aleppan territory, 
breaking their truce with Aleppo, that the citizens turned for support first to Tughtakin (who 
could not take advantage of this offer having just been defeated in battle by the Franks) and 
then to the ruler of Mosul, and finally, with great reluctance, to Ilghazi. This was a last resort: 
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even when Ilghazi arrived, he was initially denied access to the city, although he was 
grudgingly permitted to take charge soon afterwards.44  
On these grounds, Ilghazi’s rule was far from secure in 1119. The people were acutely 
in need of a protector, but if he was going to stay in control then he needed to prove to them 
that he could supply the military defence they needed. His victory at the Field of Blood 
would have bolstered his credentials, but it is entirely reasonable that the subsequent and 
rather ambiguous engagement on 14 August would have shaken any confidence he had built 
up amongst the city’s elites. Certainly Ilghazi had few other qualifications to recommend 
him, given that there was local resistance to him both as an individual and, in all likelihood, 
as a member of the Turkish ruling elite. Thus Walter’s belief that Ilghazi’s rule was far from 
secure and that he endeavoured to trumpet his ‘victory’ at Tell Danith – in part through 
humiliating his prisoners – are plausible; their humiliation represented the ‘triumphal arch 
testifying to the victor’s greatness’.45  
 On this basis, many of Walter’s statements cannot be dismissed simply as fantastical 
recreations; he was an eyewitness and many of his observations are corroborated elsewhere 
and need to be taken seriously. His specific comments regarding Ilghazi’s and Tughtakin’s 
behaviour towards the prisoners supply clues about their character and culture. One of the 
most lurid elements of Walter’s account is his description of Tughtakin’s treatment of Robert 
Fitz-Fulk, lord of Zardana, who ended up in Turkish captivity after falling from his horse 
after the second battle of Tell Danith.46 Having been transported back to Aleppo, Walter tells 
that Robert was sent twice by Ilghazi to Tughtakin, who initially condemned him to death, 
but refused to carry out the execution personally because Robert had formerly paid him 
tribute. Nevertheless, when Robert was sent for a second time to Tughtakin, he decapitated 
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him with a sword.47 Much of this tale is corroborated by the Arabic author Usama ibn 
Munqidh, who confirms both the method of execution and the fact that Robert was sent by 
Ilghazi to Tughtakin. He also mentions that Robert and Tughtakin had a prior relationship, 
although he does not establish a direct connection between this back-history and the 
negotiations surrounding Robert’s death. Usama supplies the additional detail that Ilghazi did 
not want to execute Robert because he wanted to ransom him.48 This point is not mentioned 
by Walter although he does subsequently mention other occasions when Ilghazi restrained 
Tughtakin so that he could earn ransom monies from the prisoners.49 These details aside, the 
bones of Walter report are corroborated by Usama’s account.  
More arresting is Walter’s claim that Tughtakin then converted Robert’s skull into a 
bejewelled drinking vessel.50 While it is tempting to dismiss this claim as sheer fantasy, 
included for polemical effect, there are substantial grounds for taking his claim seriously. The 
only other author of any twelfth-century crusading narrative to report this grisly practice was 
Guibert of Nogent, but crucially he too levelled this accusation solely at Tughtakin. He 
describes how in 1108 Tughtakin captured his sparring partner Gervase, lord of Tiberias 
(formerly advocate of the church of Mont-Notre-Dame in Soissons), and, like Robert, 
Tughtakin executed him and carved his skull into a cup.51 The fact that two unrelated authors 
both ascribed the same practice solely to Tughtakin at two separate moments is suggestive. 
The later Muslim chronicler Ibn al-Furat also confirms that Gervase’s head was turned into a 
drinking vessel.52 These accounts gain further credibility when it is considered that this was 
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not a standard accusation within Western Europe’s toolbox of stereotypes. True, Herodotus 
mentions this practice in a description of the Scythians, and he was widely read in medieval 
Europe, but there is nothing to suggest that either Walter or Guibert were drawing upon his 
account.53 Moreover, other sources confirm that the creation of skull cups from the 
decapitated heads of fallen enemy leaders was an established practice amongst Turkic steppe 
peoples.54 Theophanes reports that the Bulgar ruler Krum made a silver-lined cup from the 
head of the Byzantine Emperor Nikephorus I, following his victory at Varbitsa in 811.55 
Several centuries later, the Bulgar ruler Kalojan is said to have decapitated Emperor Baldwin 
I of Constantinople, whom he had imprisoned, and turned his head into a bejewelled goblet.56 
Likewise, the Russian Primary Chronicle described the Pechenegs carrying out this practice 
in the tenth century.57 In sum, it seems reasonable to conclude that Tughtakin did indeed 
possess a collection of bejewelled drinking vessels formed from the skulls of his fallen 
enemies – and that Robert’s head was added to his collection. Needless to say, this practice is 
not Islamic in inspiration and speaks rather of the world and culture of the Eurasian steppe.58  
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Other indicators of these leaders’ steppe background can be seen in the methods by 
which they killed and mutilated their prisoners. Walter lists numerous methods of execution 
and defilement employed by Tughtakin and Ilghazi, but two of these are particularly 
suggestive. The first was to suspend prisoners by their feet and then shoot them repeatedly 
with arrows. Such Turkish practices are widely attested and both Western and Eastern 
Christian authors describe Turks killing bound captives with arrows. Orderic Vitalis, Robert 
the Monk and Albert of Aachen all make this charge in their crusading narratives, Albert 
again ascribing this custom to Tughtakin.59 Likewise, Bar Hebraeus (d. 1286) describes the 
Saljuq Sultan Alp Arslan losing his life whilst carrying out just such an execution.60 Again, 
this derives from the Turks’ steppe background where archery-themed symbolic acts and 
rituals are widely referenced in the surviving sources. In a similar vein, at an earlier point in 
his second book, Walter reports Ilghazi scalping his enemies.61 This too speaks of Ilghazi’s 
Central Asian background. He is not alone in carrying out such acts, and Albert of Aachen 
also indicates that Tughtakin scalped his enemies.62 Indeed, as Hillenbrand has shown, his 
very name references the Turkish practice of bearing tughs (often horse-tail banners but also 
trophies made from human remains, such as hair) on spear points into battle.63 Other accounts 
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of Turks scalping their enemies occur in many of sources from the Twelfth and Thirteenth 
centuries, in texts produced by authors from very different backgrounds.64 
Perhaps the best known – certainly the most widely reported – of Ilghazi’s foibles was 
his penchant for drinking binges. Walter recalls that at one point during his sojourn in Aleppo 
after the second battle of Tell Danith he remained ‘as if dead’ (quasi mortuus) in a state of 
uncontrollable intoxication for 15 days.65 He is not alone in reporting Ilghazi’s sustained 
drunkenness. Usama ibn Munqidh went further, claiming that he was frequently inebriated 
for upwards of 20 days and that, after defeating the Franks at the Field of Blood, he never 
really recovered until the arrival of Baldwin II of Jerusalem in northern Syria.66 In terms of 
strictest factual accuracy, Usama is probably at error here because, as Tezcan points out, 
Ilghazi spent the period immediately after the Field of Blood besieging al-Atharib and 
Zardana, rather than overindulging in drink.67 Nevertheless, Usama’s report still reflects 
Ilghazi’s reputation and he was probably offering a slightly misremembered report of 
Ilghazi’s drinking after the second battle of Tell Danith, which took place only a short while 
later.  
Ilghazi and Tughtakin were not the only Turks to be accused of drunkenness. 
Hillenbrand has suggested that drunkenness formed part of the derisory stereotype that 
contemporary Arabs ascribed to the Turks.68 This seems to have been particularly the case in 
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the early years of Turkish rule when the discourse of Turkish piety and idealised rule was 
only beginning to emerge. The famous atabeg Zengi, conqueror of Edessa, is said to have 
died in a state of drunkenness.69 Needless to say, the Turks’ tendency towards intoxication 
stands at variance to their characterisation as pious Muslims, yet it is the duration of these 
binges that is so distinctive and which requires particular attention. Frequently their bouts –
with Ilghazi as a prime example – are said to have lasted for a prolonged period, spanning 
days if not weeks. As Peacock has demonstrated Turkish sultans likewise could dedicate 
large blocks of time to drinking and the Qabusnama by Kayka’us recommended that rulers 
should devote two to three days per week to drinking.70 Such drinking parties were common 
among Turkish elites and reflect the influence of steppe culture where the drinking of qumiz 
(fermented mare’s milk), among other alcoholic brews, was part of everyday life and ritual.71  
 The excerpts considered thus far tend towards the view that these warlords were 
continuators of existing steppe practices, rather than adopters of Islamic culture. 
Nevertheless, there are other pieces of evidence that may tend in a rather different direction. 
At two points in his chronicle Walter reports Tughtakin and Ilghazi offering their captives a 
choice between death and the renunciation of their Christian faith.72 On both occasions 
Walter informs his readers that the captives in question refused to deny their religion and 
were consequently killed. These are interesting episodes for this present question because the 
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basic fact that the Turks wished to convert their captives implies that they possessed a strong 
spiritual identity and attached a degree of importance to effecting coerced conversion in the 
name of their faith. Also, it is fairly clear that the religion they had in mind must have been 
Islam (rather than their pre-Islamic beliefs) because, following the refusal of the prisoners to 
yield to his demands, Ilghazi requested that the ‘patriarch of Damascus’ (referred to 
immediately afterwards as the archadius) kill a selected prisoner: Arnulf, seneschal of 
Marash.73 Exactly who this ‘patriarch’ was is unclear. The suggestion has been made that 
either he may have been an imam or, alternatively, the term archadius may be a garbled 
reference to a qadi, (a judge who interprets religious law).74 This would make sense and, to 
take another example, Metcalfe, in discussion of William of Malaterra’s De rebus gestis 
Rogerii, noted that in William’s history of the Normans in Sicily there are references to an 
archadius from Palermo and another from Syracuse; he too felt that these were references to 
qadis.75 Thus this conclusion is probably correct. Regarding the identity of this qadi, one 
possibility is that he was Abu al-Fadl Ibn al-Khashshab. Certainly this qadi was present at 
this time and, according to Kamal al-Din, he made a speech to the Turkmen troops on the eve 
of the Field of Blood inciting them to fight the Franks.76 Nevertheless, he cannot be identified 
unproblematically as the individual in question, not least because he was the Aleppan, rather 
than a Damascene, qadi.77 Whoever this patriarch may have been, he was evidently a senior 
Islamic religious leader, and these Turkish leaders clearly attached a value to his presence 
during these proceedings and wished to convert the Franks to his faith. In addition, by 
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offering the prisoners a choice between apostasy and death, they may have been adhering to 
the Islamic law which required Muslims to offer prisoners the opportunity to convert before 
execution.78  
These are all indicators of their Islamic identity, but even here there are important 
nuances. Strikingly, Walter reports that this ‘patriarch’ refused to execute the prisoner as 
Ilghazi had asked, offering the sword instead to a nearby emir. Apparently he excused 
himself, ‘pricked by conscience’ (mente compunctus),79 saying to the emir: ‘you carry out 
this act of respect for our law in my place! So great a man should lose his head at the hand of 
a great knight.’80 Clearly the patriarch was troubled by Ilghazi’s actions, although it is not 
clear precisely why he was so uneasy. Perhaps he was sickened by the whole proceedings. 
Perhaps he had some other political motive or reason. Certainly when Saladin later invited 
Muslim clerics to kill bound Frankish prisoners taken in 1178 it was viewed by peers as a 
highly distasteful deed.81  Either way, the patriarch’s discomfiture clearly manifested itself 
sufficiently in his public behaviour to attract Walter’s attention, and it strongly suggests that 
he perceived a discordance between, on one hand, Ilghazi’s and Tughtakin’s actions and, on 
the other, those of the main Islamic religious leader there present.82  
This unsettled relationship between religious leaders and Turkish commanders 
manifests itself in other sources. Returning to the Aleppan qadi Abu al-Fadl ibn al-
Khashshab, Kamal al-Din reports that when he began to address the Turkmen troops before 
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the Field of Blood he was immediately mocked by one Turkish warrior who asked his 
comrades why they should obey a man in a turban. Kamal al-Din goes on to report that Ibn 
al-Khashshab rose above such heckling to offer an inspirational speech. Even so, the mere 
fact that he was interrupted in this way (and that this interjection was deemed worthy of 
recording) implies that he was not unanimously well received within the army.83 This again 
seems to indicate a separation between elements among the Turkmen and the Islamic leaders 
accompanying them. Alternatively, this uneasy episode may reflect Ibn al-Khashshab’s 
position as a Twelver Shia cleric, a status which might set him apart from his – at least 
nominally – Sunni Turkish allies. This certainly seems the most likely explanation, but this in 
itself is striking because it was not common for a Shia cleric to be allowed to accompany and 
address a Turkish army.  
Another practice Walter attaches to Ilghazi and the Turks of northern Syria is a 
reverence for auguries and astrology. Describing the advent of the Sultan’s army in 1115 he 
reports the Turks ‘taking auguries from the sun and moon’.84 Likewise, one of Ilghazi’s 
soldiers is depicted recommending to his master that the Christian prisoners be tortured as 
part of their ‘astrological rituals’.85 Walter’s conviction that the Turks revered such omens is 
entirely plausible and probably has a basis in fact. Strikingly, in 1105, the Damascene writer 
al-Sulami, in his Kitab al-Jihad, specifically warned the ‘community of sultans of this 
country’ (a direct allusion to his Turkish overlords, possibly including Tughtakin) to spurn 
astrologers, a statement that reveals his fear that they were prone to such influences.86 Other 
Muslim sources describe the Turks consulting the stars and famously so too does the Gesta 
Francorum in its report of the Turkish general Karbugha being warned by his mother not to 
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take the field against the forces of the First Crusade.87 Likewise, astrological signs, symbols 
and charts are well represented in the Turks’ material culture.88  
What is unclear however is whether these rituals should be characterised as a 
manifestation of the Turks’ former steppe culture or whether they had adopted them during 
their conquest of the Near East. The Arab nobleman Usama ibn Munqidh, for example, 
alluded to astrological practices in both his home town of Shaizar and in Fatimid Egypt. Even 
his father was a devotee of the horoscopes, an interest he pursued ‘even with all his pious 
scrupulosity’.89 Astrology cannot be automatically labelled as a Turkish import to the region 
when it was already well embedded amongst the local dynasties. On the other hand, 
traditional steppe beliefs also incorporated such practices and the alternative interpretation is 
that these were long-standing customs practiced by the incoming Turks, including Ilghazi (or 
perhaps a mixture of both influences).90 On this point it is difficult to be sure, but it is 
suggestive that it is typically only the early crusading histories that report Turkish 
astrological rituals. Christian authors from the later twelfth and thirteenth centuries are almost 
silent about such practices. Perhaps this is a reflection of the Turks’ deepening engagement 
with Islam over this period; and correspondingly their abandonment of other influences. 
Wherever the truth may lie in this matter, the Turks’ interest in astrology adds a further 
component to the Turks’ already varied topography of spiritual beliefs.  
Cumulatively, these reports of Tughtakin’s and Ilghazi’s behaviour build an image of 
two leaders who saw some value in signalling their adherence to Islam. They respected 
Muslim religious leaders (who by turn seem to have been unsettled by their Turkish 
                                                          
87 Gesta Francorum: the Deeds of the Franks and the Other Pilgrims to Jerusalem, ed. R. Hill (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1962), 55; Ibn al-Athir, The Annals of the Saljuq Turks, trans. D.S. Richards (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2002), 151. 
88 Canby and others, Court and Cosmos, passim. 
89 Usama Ibn Munqidh, Book of Contemplation, 33 (quotation from 67); P. Cobb, Usama ibn Munqidh: Warrior 
Poet of the Age of the Crusades (Oxford: One World, 2005), 78–80.  
90 A. Peacock, Early Seljūq History: a New Interpretation (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 124–5. 
25 
 
overlords) and they perceived conversion to Islam to be important. Nevertheless, so many of 
their actions speak of customs or ritual behaviours that are redolent of their pre-Islamic 
steppe culture. Islamic culture had penetrated only superficially into these zones of 
behaviour. It seems likely that, as Bar Hebraeus later suggested, their newfound Islamic 
religious adherence was driven largely at least in part by pragmatic political logic.91 They 
were relatively new conquerors and they needed to secure support from the Muslim populace. 
It is useful to recall here a comment made by Kaplony regarding Turkic conversion to Islam 
in Central Asia which fits well in this Syrian context: ‘pre-Mongolian Turks considered 
converting to Islam not as turning away from, or even denying, their Turkish past, but rather 
as an addition to their identity, as a new dimension.’92 A politic adherence to Islam might 
have been deemed advantageous and aspects of their new faith may have been spiritually 
attractive, but Turkish commanders were plainly unwilling to jettison their former pastimes 
and customs, including those which stood in direct contravention of Islamic law. Indeed they 
may have perceived no need to abandon their old beliefs as a necessary predicate for the 
adoption of the new. As conquerors they presumably believed that it was for them to dictate 
those cultural/religious practices they would adopt from their conquered subjects (and those 
which they would not). They certainly were not going to be dictated to.  
Ilghazi and Tughtakin emerge as products of their time. Their behaviour and conduct 
reflects a mid-point in the slow transition by which the Turks were remoulded from 
shamanistic steppe nomads into settled Islamic rulers. Whether they deserve to be labelled as 
barbarians, brutes or drunks – as historians of the early twentieth century have captioned 
                                                          
91 Bar Hebraeus, Chronography of Gregory Abû’l Faraj, 195. For discussion, see A.M. Khazanov, ‘The Spread 
of World Religions in Medieval Nomadic Societies of the Eurasian Steppes’, in Nomadic Diplomacy, 
Destruction and Religion from the Pacific to the Adriatic, eds. M. Gervers and W. Schlepp (Toronto: Joint 
Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, 1994), 11–33; T. Stepanov, The Bulgars and the Steppe Empire in the Early 
Middle Ages: the Problem of the Others, trans. T. Stefanova and T. Stepanov (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 64.  
92 A. Kaplony, ‘The Conversion of the Turks of Central Asia to Islam as Seen by Arabic and Persian 
Geography: a Comparative Perspective’, Cahiers de Studia Iranica 39 (2008): 328. 
26 
 
them – is irrelevant.93 Dismissing their attitudes towards violence, spirituality and/or alcohol 
as unadorned vice or barbarity brings us no closer to understanding the cultural milieu of 
which they were part.  
One of the most fascinating aspects of this study has been to see how strenuously 
contemporary and later Muslim intellectuals sought to present leaders such as Tughtakin and 
Ilghazi as exemplary Islamic rulers. As the evidence discussed here has shown, such 
depictions clearly stretched reality whilst covering up a multitude of behaviours that did not 
fit the desired discourse. Reflecting upon such characterisations, it would be easy to dismiss 
these idealised portrayals as mere propaganda: authors simply giving their later, fully-
Islamicised Turkish masters a version of history that was more suited to their agendas/tastes. 
There is almost certainly some truth in this and yet there seems also to have been a more 
complex venture at work. An important author here, whose work perhaps reflects this 
endeavour, is al-Sulami (d. 1106). In essence his Kitab is a call for jihad against the Franks, 
which offers guidance and advice on the conduct of holy war supported with exemplars 
drawn from the early Islamic period. It is an orthodox piece of work intended for an orthodox 
listener. Christie shows that it was intended for a wide audience, including the Turkish sultan, 
but he also observes that it may also have had an impact on local rulers such as Tughtakin.94 
Al-Sulami accepts the principle of Saljuq authority and repeatedly affirms the sultan’s overall 
supremacy (and his responsibility to lead the military jihad against the crusaders).95 Given the 
above discussion, al-Sulami’s pious Kitab al-Jihad feels rather out of place when compared 
with reports of Tughtakin’s drinking bouts, his scalping, his skull cups and his other 
distinctively steppe-influenced practices. Perhaps the disjuncture between the text’s message 
and Tughtakin’s behaviour can be dismissed by styling al-Sulami as a propagandist, a writer 
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adhering more to an approved Saljuq discourse than to reality. Nevertheless, there is 
something more here. It seems more likely that al-Sulami, in so far as he was addressing 
Tughtakin and his other Turkish masters, was gently seeking to steer him and his peers away 
from the steppe practices of his forefathers and into a more recognisably Islamic mould. 
Perhaps the Islamic scholars who presented Turkish warlords as exemplary Muslim rulers 
were seeking to shape their masters as much as their masters were trying to legitimise their 
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